This paper examines intellectual property (IP) management in U.S. companies and addresses three questions: What are typical sources of IP? How do companies manage IP? What role do donations of IP play in IP management?
Introduction
Intellectual property (IP) management issues are gaining increased attention from corporations that are scrutinizing their portfolios searching for a better return on investment in technology and R&D. Patents have become an important responsibility for managers in technology-based companies as well as an important part of justifying R&D expenses (see Arora, Ceccagnoli and Cohen, 2003) . In a comprehensive strategy, reasons for patenting have been shown to extend beyond direct profit from the invention to blocking, cross licensing, and prevention of law suits (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000) . Given the importance and value of patents and, more generally, intellectual property, many firms are increasingly realizing the value of their IP department. These departments possess unique strategic information about the firms' business units. An IP Integrated Management System (IPIMS) has been proposed in the literature to take advantage of the unique position of the IP Department (Daizadeh, 2003) .
Utilizing the IP department as a repository of knowledge and a bridge between R&D and market information are important aspects of this system. Other studies have focused on the legal aspects of protecting IP, decision-making processes for IP, utilization of software to assist with IP management and even compensation systems which enhance IP (Ruston, 1996; Spector and Zuckerman, 1997; Wolf, 1999; Teece, 2000; Xu, Wang & Wang, 2001; Ernst and Soll, 2003; Pauly, 2003) .
The research presented in this note focuses on three questions:
• What are typical sources of IP?
• How do companies manage IP?
• What role do donations of IP play in a company's IP management?
Description of the Data and Methodology
A case study methodology was utilized with a sample of 15 companies in Northeast Ohio. Semi-structured interviews were conducted on site at each of the companies. The data were analyzed using standard procedures for qualitative analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; Larsson, 1993) . At least two members of the research team were present at each interview, which normally took about 1.5 hours. The interview guide is available upon request. The 15 companies were chosen from an initial list of 100 technology-based companies in Northeast Ohio generated from previous research by one of the authors (RB). Twenty-five companies that were judged likely to be involved with generating and protecting IP were then selected to participate in the study. Of these, we were able to arrange interviews at the chief technology officer or IP manager (or IP counsel) level at 15 of these companies; eight public and seven private. The companies ranged in size from about 25 employees to 95,000 and in age from start-ups to companies 135 years old. Five industries (reflecting areas of relative strength in the regional economy) were primary targets: (1) instruments and electronics, (2) biotechnology/biomedicine, (3) polymers and advanced materials, (4) software, and (5) industrial machinery. The companies agreed to participate in this study on the condition of anonymity, and thus their names are withheld.
What are typical sources of IP?
The first set of questions in the interviews related to the sources of IP. The interview results show that the vast majority of IP in the sample firms was obtained from in-house development. In all but three of the interviewed firms, technology development was centralized in a central R&D group, with some functions decentralized to the division level.
The interviewed companies were much more focused on in-house technology development than on acquiring technology or IP from outside the firm. This was generally true for all the interviewed firms, but technology acquisition from outside played a more prominent role in the smaller companies. In fact, some of the smaller companies started with external (licensed) technology, but subsequently relied primarily on internally developed technology for most of their needs. Several of the smaller companies continued to assign personnel to systematically look for external technology. As a consequence, the smaller companies were, surprisingly, looking more systematically at technology acquisition opportunities and were better organized to acquire technology from outside than the larger companies. This may be related to the fact that new technology developments were central to the survival of the small firms and thus represented a more immediate need than in the larger companies.
Only two companies relied exclusively on in-house R&D. All the other companies relied at least to some extent on external sources. Joint ventures/alliances were the most commonly cited source of external technology (eight mentions), followed by acquisition of companies (seven mentions), acquisition of licenses and consulting/contract R&D (six mentions each). Joint ventures were never mentioned as the most important source of external technology. Instead, acquisition of companies was the most important source of external technology in four cases, while contract R&D played that role in three cases and acquisition of licenses in two cases.
Few companies pursued a strategy of regularly licensing external technology except for a small fraction of their needs. In cases where external technology was obtained, it was primarily in non-core areas. In general there was a trend toward making better use of, and being more open to, external technology. Some companies obtained technology by acquiring other companies, although the primary driver for the acquisition was just as likely to be distribution or customer networks. Companies were likely to use universities for recruiting employees and as a source of consultants, but they were unlikely to obtain successful technology from universities. Nonetheless, four of the companies had substantial collaborations with universities to develop technology.
Some of the companies allowed the individuals, product managers, or product development teams to decide when they needed technology from the outside. These people are the "most knowledgeable" about what is appropriate to license. One of the interviewed firms seemed to be ahead of all the other companies in this regard with an intellectual asset management team, gatekeepers matching external technologies to corporate strategy, and a skills and capabilities database. Several companies used databases to search externally, including the United States Patent & Trademark Office and yet2.com. One of the small companies in the survey noted that a venture capital firm was closely involved in any technology acquisition they considered, probably due to the start-up nature of this company.
All but two of the interviewed firms have licensed technology from external sources, although four companies have done so on a very limited basis, involving either technologies peripheral to the main business or so-called "use licenses." The companies that obtained licenses did so from a variety of sources, including both universities and other companies. One company commented that universities tend to overvalue their licenses, since they usually involve early-stage technology. The main rationale for entering into a license was that it was cheaper and faster than in-house development (although in one case the opposite result occurred). The license was then typically used to develop the technology further, protect the new intellectual property (via patent or trade secret), and use it in developing new business.
The choice between buying a license and in-house development depended in part on the expected length of the product life cycle. In most cases, licensed technology was found to meet the needs of the licensee. The protection of the licensed technology was primarily in the form of patents, but also trade secrets were used in joint ventures, as well as cross-licensing.
Technology that could not be detected or easily reverse engineered was kept as a trade secret; if it could be reverse engineered, it was patented. Since detection technology is improving, patents are being sought more frequently than in the past. On the other hand, in cases when reverse engineering was a concern, trade secrets were still utilized. Defensive patenting occurred, but it was not a common practice.
The sources of IP may be summarized as follows: 1) In-house development was the primary source for all the companies interviewed but only 2 of the 15 companies relied exclusively on in-house development; 2) Small companies were more likely to systematically search for external technology but were still reliant primarily on internal development; 3) Joint ventures/alliances were the most commonly cited source of external technology (eight mentions), followed by acquisition of companies (seven mentions), acquisition of licenses and consulting/contract R&D (six mentions each); and 4) Universities were rarely used as significant sources of technology except as the initial source at the formation of the company; nonetheless, four companies maintained technology development collaborations with universities.
How Do Companies Manage Intellectual Property?
Introduction -All but three of the interviewed firms own patents or have patents pending. The number of patents owned ranged from one to over 200. As expected, the companies also use trade secret protection in combination with patents. The main reasons companies cited for using trade secrets instead of patents were the risks associated with disclosing technology in patent applications, the costs of patent applications, and the trend of increasing lead times for patent actions and decreasing product life cycles, rendering the patent protection period too short. Some firms mentioned that improved reverse engineering techniques by competitors force them to rely more on patents than in the past while also working on new product designs that are harder to reverse engineer.
The companies that did not formally rely on trade secrets were among the smallest and youngest in the sample. Presumably they had proprietary information within their firm but their lack of formal processes or even concern for protecting trade secrets was striking. They did not have significant intellectual property to protect and seemed to be more interested in making sure that vendors and customers understand their technology than in protecting it. However, they also were pursuing patents to protect key parts of their intellectual property, as well as to establish their technological capability credentials. Other companies also pursued patents in order to increase the value of the company to impress investors and/or provide leverage in discussions with strategic partners, in addition to the more usual goals of excluding competitors and obtaining a competitive advantage.
One company mentioned that the value of their patents had been questioned due to both product margin pressure and the lack of respect for patents in China, where they were doing increasing business. Another company noted that fear of major competitors held them back from patenting and from enforcing patents they had already obtained: they did not want to get into patent battles with large competitors. They were fearful that if they enforced their patents, then a large competitor might enforce some of their own, causing significant legal expenses for the company. One company had an internal competitive analysis group that reviewed what type of intellectual property protection was most beneficial.
IP Management Processes -During the interviews, some common themes emerged with regard to the process of managing intellectual property. A general schematic of these processes is shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Archetypes of two general IP management processes
In general, the IP processes we observed began with encouragement from either an internal IP committee or from investors in the case of the small companies. These groups tended to have a "big picture" view of the IP process and could identify general areas for IP development that would be valuable to the firm. They were market driven and relied on external observations to determine the IP areas that were of interest. These groups sometimes relied on electronic searches and databases to assist them with information gathering in order to make determinations of what areas were most important for IP development. After an inventor has generated a specific patent idea (generally disclosed to the firm on a standardized form for internal review), the interviews revealed two general paths the disclosure could take. In one case a formal review by a patent committee was the next stage of the process ("Path B", Figure 1 ). The committee could be made up of a variety of people, depending on the firm, but it was generally cross divisional and asked the expected questions about strategic fit, defensibility, expected return, etc. In some firms, however, the disclosure went simply from the inventor to a line manager ("Path A," Figure 1 ) who made an informal determination of the value of the proposed invention and decided on whether or not to pursue the patent. Prosecution of the patent was then conducted outside the firm (i.e., outsourced to an external firm) in all cases.
In the case of Path B, review by a corporate-wide patent committee, leveraging the patent across divisions is facilitated. That is, cross-division synergies are more easily identified by such a committee than by divisional line managers. But the process is necessarily slowed by the use of such a committee simply due to the logistics of committee meetings and decision making processes for a cross-divisional committee as opposed to an individual. This highlights the advantages of Path A which utilizes the line manager for the review. The process is rapid and focused on the divisional needs. Thus, when a patent is "time-critical" and the cross-divisional synergies are not important, the line manager path (A) is an appropriate way to organize the disclosure screening process. The BU Assignment Model illustrated in Figure 2 should be utilized when it is critical to leverage IP across BU's for the success of the organization but the appropriate IP is not easily uncovered. That is, the IP is deep within the BU and is not easily accessed by a fully centralized IP group. The attributes of this model include:
• Strong BU buy-in and input to IP processes
• Facilitates training of researchers in IP process • IP expertise is easily developed and maintained
• Depth of IP analysis is strong (external threats and internal opportunities)
• May not get BU input and thus some IP may be overlooked Miscellaneous Observations -Most companies did not patent technology that they did not intend to directly commercialize. Thus, the value of licensing was not a consideration in patent decisions. Although this may overlook ways to capture value from existing know-how, the defocusing effect of pursuing patents that would not apply directly to a product was deemed to outweigh the possible benefits. When asked about the extent to which the company's industry relies on patent protection, trade secrets, lead time advantage, or other forms of protection of intellectual property, six companies put patents first, five placed trade secrets first, and four said that lead time was most important.
Most of the companies indicated that they would use an external patent database as a way to find technologies to in-license if an effective method (i.e., a broker) could be found to access the technologies. A few brokers were mentioned, but none were judged to be highly successful. Concern was expressed about support for external technology once it is found: a broker can market technologies, but not support them.
What role do donations of IP play in a company's IP process?
A new process of technology transfer has emerged during the past 10 to 15 years -Intellectual Property (IP) donations -a form of IP brokering. In this process, firms with IP that they do not intend to commercialize or otherwise competitively exploit, 1 donate this IP to a nonprofit organization, such as a university or a technology-based nonprofit organization. This enables the donating firm to gain immediate value through the tax implications of the donation and allows the donee organization, at least in theory, to commercially exploit the IP through, for example, practicing the IP in-house or licensing it to a third party. This transaction is a type of "brokering" which, in its broadest form, can be likened to the development of the securities market when brokers and stock exchanges emerged to facilitate the flow of funds from investor to corporate entity. In this case the flow of technological know-how is enhanced via this intellectual property transfer through the nonprofit organization.
2
We asked each firm whether they had donated or thought about donating their IP to a nonprofit organization. We found that only one firm actua lly donated some of its IP. The donor firm in the present study is a large public company with large internal development and The high cost of technology transfer resulting from the donee's desire to have access to the donor's know-how relevant to the IP asset and the ongoing financial commitment that many donees require from the donors to meet the costs associated with patent maintenance fees and R&D support to enhance the patents; and 4) Cultural obstacles within the donor firm. This reason is more nebulous and firm specific, but the common theme is a general discomfort with the concept of donating IP or a firm structure that is ill-suited to implement a donation process.
There are also more general reasons why IP donations may not even be considered. One reason may be that the costs of completing the donation exceed the tax deduction value. There is more incentive if the donor does not need to pay an external party for the valuation study.
Also, the company must be profitable in the year of the donation or there is no allowable deduction. Further, it may be necessary for the donor to assemble a package that would be attractive to a donee. This might include hardware, know-how, etc., that would shorten the path to commercialization and reduce their risk. In addition, the donor must have a certain risk tolerance due to the uncertainty about how the IRS will view the donation and the fact that the IP could eventually be obtained by a competitor.
Many smaller, privately owned, technology-focused companies have high IP intelligence quotients and sophisticated IP management. However, often donation is not as compelling to them because their tax management strategy is different from that of a public company. They are not as driven to maximize annual profit but rather are often more interested in increasing the asset value through the IP.
It is interesting to note that donees are becoming more selective. Universities look for synergies with research or a venture with which they are already engaged. They are much less interested in donations that offer them little prospect for commercialization. In order to further substantiate our interview findings we decided to gather more data.
An on-line survey was sent to over 7,200 companies nationally, and follow-up phone calls were made. However, the response rate was quite low (< 1 %); hence, only an impressionistic summary of the results is reported here. Details of the survey are available upon request.
Only 3 of the 21 companies that gave quality responses reported that they had donated IP. 15 other companies reported that they had donated but did not provide much detail.
Generating good will was the most commonly cited reason, followed by tax benefits and other financial benefits. Philanthropy was also cited as a reason.
Among the 18 companies that did not donate IP, four stated that the primary reasons why they did not donate were anticipated tax law changes and that the costs of the IP valuation process were too high. Three of the companies stated that the tax benefit legitimacy was uncertain. Other reasons were that the company had no IP to donate, and that patents might have minimal value to someone outside their business.
Similar answers were given when the companies that did not donate IP were asked whether they expected to donate patents in the future. 10 stated that some of the primary reasons why they will not donate patents included an uncertain tax benefit valuation and 8 agreed that other reasons included the possible tax law changes and the high valuation costs.
Other reasons cited include that as more and more people have access to the same information, lead time will become more important than patenting.
In the follow-up telephone conversations a few other reasons emerged for not donating IP to a nonprofit organization: (1) there is no IP to donate, or (b) the company is too small, and (c) their venture capitalists would not allow an IP donation. Yet another reason why companies do not donate is that they do not develop their IP in-house.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
The firms interviewed for this study develop their IP position from a wide variety of sources such as joint ventures, acquisitions and consulting contracts. However, internal development was still the primary source of IP. Internal patenting processes appeared to follow two general paths; one which relied on some type of IP committee and another which simply empowered divisional line managers to make patenting decisions. Organizationally, three structural archetypes were identified, each with its unique advantages and drawbacks.
Whereas a centralized structure is more conducive to maintaining patent expertise, leveraging patents and IP across divisions, it can be slow and unresponsive to divisional needs. A purely decentralized IP structure may be able to respond rapidly and capture hidden IP within a division but will not be as able to find synergies across divisions. Also, it may not have the depth of patent expertise needed for the development of a complex IP strategy. Perhaps the best compromise structure observed in this study involves the divisional assignment where a multi-business unit or division committee oversees IP. This enables the needs of the divisions to be met while leveraging IP across multiple divisions. The semi-centralized nature of this archetype is also conducive to a reasonable depth of IP knowledge by creating a centralized IP team while sharing costs among divisions.
Concerning IP donations, the response rate to our on-line survey was too low for us to draw any definitive conclusions. IP donations clearly do not appear to be a major phenomenon.
Our survey results suggest that tax benefits are an important driver and that recent tax law changes have diminished the incentives to donate IP. Potential good will benefits constitute another motive. The uncertainty of tax benefits and the costs associated with IP valuation appear to be the main disincentives. Our impression is that the low survey response rate may be
